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January 24, 1967

Talking Points
for
Discussion with UK

1. Art. I - The UK ask whether we should not consider the question of "preparations for manufacture" on the lines described by Mrs Myrdahl at the EMDC. We did consider that problem in deciding to eliminate "preparations" from our draft. We felt it just too hard to define. We now would prohibit "manufacture" (but not preparations) and we hope that safeguards will cover those steps less than manufacture which might be consistent with either a weapons or a peaceful purpose. This was not discussed explicitly with the Sovs, who ^{accepted} ~~agreed~~ to our proposal to simplify the language by eliminating "preparation".

2. Art. IV - (a) Re possible non-nuclear concerns:
 We believe we should wait and see how combination of amendments and review clause is received by non-nuclears before suggesting any changes. This was, surprisingly enough, difficult to ^{negotiate} ~~reach~~ agreement upon. We would not wish to upset the agreement without very good reason.

(b) Re FRG concerns: We have told Germans as follows:

(1.) With respect to conference problems, the language of Article IV, paras. 1 and 2 providing for possibility of a conference on amendments is derived from the limited test ban treaty. Secretary Rusk testified in 1963 that "we preserve our right to object" should the GDR subsequently seek to assert privileges under the test ban treaty such as endeavoring to attend an amendments conference. We advised the FRG then that it was our intention to oppose GDR participation and we could not foresee any situation in which we would fail to interpose objection. (Deptel 200 to PARIS, repeated as 489 to BONN) Unless the FRG has other views, our present thinking with respect to an NPT amendments clause is along the same lines. The same position would, of course, apply to para. 3 of Article IV calling for a review conference.

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(2.) The treaty would contain an accessions clause similar to that of the limited test ban treaty. As in the case of that treaty, we would reject a GDR signature in Washington and presume the UK would do so in London. If France should indicate interest in adhering and becoming a depositary government, we assume she would reject a GDR signature in Paris also. An FRG signature would be accepted in three or four capitals; GDR in only one. We would, of course, make a general disclaimer statement as we did with the test ban treaty and the space treaty. The basis for our right to object to GDR participation in a conference would be general lack of recognition of the GDR as a state -- a fact reflected in the rejection of the GDR's signature or accession by all depositary governments but one.

3. Art. V - ^{London} ~~Franklin~~ should now have received text this article. We believe number should not be specified, but should be fairly large. We will probably not get the important near nuclear until a fairly large number of others have joined.

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